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The Continuing Violation Theory of Title VII After
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans
By John Cary *
The "continuing violation" theory is a doctrine created by plain-
tiffs' attorneys in employment discrimination lawsuits based on Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The doctrine enables a court to
find jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim that otherwise would be time-
barred by Title VII's short charge-filing period, which requires plain-
tiffs to file a timely charge of employment discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to maintaining a private action.2 To be timely, a
charge must be filed within the limitation period which, in most states,
3
* B.A., 1977, University of California at Berkeley. Member, Third Year Class. Spe-
cial thanks to Ken Hecht of the Employment Law Center for his assistance.
I. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to
2000h-6 (1976)). Title VII became effective July 2, 1965. The Civil Rights Act was amended
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 which deals specifically with employ-
ment discrimination. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) (section 706(d) of Title VII); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). See Electrical Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers,
Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). Upon receiving a charge, the EEOC will determine if the
charge was timely filed. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). If timely, the agency will investi-
gate the facts of the case. If the charge is justified, the EEOC will try to negotiate with the
employer for appropriate relief. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If this fails, the EEOC either will file suit
(rarely) or will issue a "right to sue" letter to the charging party. Id. § 2000e-5Q)(l). The
charging party must then fie suit in court within 90 days of receipt of the "right to sue"
letter. Id.
3. The filing period is 300 days in states with a similar agency empowered to act upon
charges of employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). As originally enacted
in 1964, the Act required aggrieved persons to file a charge of employment discrimination
with the EEOC within 90 days of the discriminatory act. Section 706(d) was amended, effec-
tive March 24, 1972, to extend the time for filing with the EEOC to 180 days. The time
periods were and are longer in states with agencies that handle employment discrimination
charges, giving states an opportunity to act before the charge is taken to the EEOC. Section
706(c) of Tide VII provides that if a discriminatory employment act occurs in a state with an
agency empowered to grant or seek relief from such practice, the aggrieved person may not
file a charge with the EEOC before the expiration of 60 days after proceedings have com-
menced with the state agency, unless such proceedings bive been terminated earlier. The
original version of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided that if a discriminatory act took place
in a deferral state (one with an agency empowered to act on a discrimination charge), an
aggrieved person's charges would be considered timely if fied with the EEOC within 210
days of the discriminatory act or 30 days after receipt of notice that the local agency had
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is 180 days "after the unlawful employment practice occurred."' 4 Ac-
cordingly, any private Title VII lawsuit based solely on acts taking
place prior to the limitation period, t e., more than 180 days prior to
filing of the charge, must fail for lack of jurisdiction. To determine
whether a timely charge has been filed, one must first determine when
the alleged discrimination took place and hence when the limitation
period started to run. As interpreted by the courts, however, a discrimi-
natory act can take place over a period of time.5 Under the continuing
violation theory, by showing that a discriminatory practice is continu-
ing, a plaintiff will have a timely charge even though the charge was
filed more than 180 days after the practice first occurred. A continuing
violation thus involves more than a single discriminatory act; it can be
a series of related acts, a discriminatory pattern or policy, or the contin-
uing effects of a discriminatory act.
A useful tool for analysis of private Title VII actions is the separa-
tion of the actions into the "violation phase" and the "remedy phase."'6
During the violation phase of a trial, the court determines whether a
violation of Title VII took place during the limitation period. This gen-
erally involves three issues: (1) Did the plaintiff prove substantive lia-
bility under Title VII? (2) When did the violation take place? (3) Was
a charge filed with the EEOC within 180 days of this date? If the plain-
tiff cannot prove that a Title VII violation took place during the limita-
tion period, the court must dismiss plaintiff's action for lack of
jurisdiction.7 If the plaintiff can prove substantive liability and timely
filing of a charge with the EEOC, an action may enter the remedy
phase.
During the remedy phase the court fashions appropriate "make
terminated its proceedings (whichever was earlier was the applicable time limit). Section
706(e) of the 1972 amended version of Title VII extends the time period to 300 days in
deferral states.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
5. In hiring discrimination cases, for example, courts have held that the discrimina-
tory act is not completed and the limitation period does not begin to run on an applicant's
charge of discriminatory denial of employment until the position is filled by another appli-
cant. See Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting asser-
tion that discrimination against plaintiff occurred when she was interviewed and holding
that "[tihe alleged unlawful employment practice is not complete until the position is filled
and no longer available to the claimant"). But see Phillips v. Columbia Gas of W. Va., Inc.,
347 F. Supp. 533, 537-38 (S.D.W. Va. 1972), aft'd, 474 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1973) (rejecting in
dicta similar contention with respect to replacement of discharged employee).
6. This approach was used by a federal district court when it analyzed the continuing
violation theory. Miller v. Miami Prefabricators, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 176, 178-79 (S.D. Fla.
1977). The Supreme Court referred to the same distinction between the violation issue and
the remedy issue in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559 (1977). See also Acha
v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064 (2d
Cir. 1977).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). See note 3 supra.
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whole" relief for the victims of employment discrimination. 8 Title VII
relief is equitable in nature and may be both prospective, e.g., injunc-
tive orders, declaratory relief, or front pay; and retrospective, e.g., ret-
roactive seniority or back pay. Although the limitation period is
applicable only to the violation phase,9 the continuing violation theory
affects both the violation phase and the remedy phase. During the rem-
edy phase, courts may consider discriminatory acts occurring prior to
the limitation period and provide a remedy for such acts if a continuing
violation exists.10 The reasoning behind this theory is that the individ-
ual acts are simply incidents of a continuing discriminatory practice for
which the defendant has been found liable during the violation phase.
Absent a continuing violation, however, relief is limited in scope to acts
taking place during the limitation period.
The continuing violation theory is not a means of finding substan-
tive liability under Title VII, but rather is a theoretical justification
used by courts to find jurisdiction over discriminatory acts or practices
taking place prior to the limitation period. Although the theory is com-
plex and often confusing to apply, its purpose is merely to allow Title
VII relief to cover the entire period in which continuing discrimination
has taken place, with certain restrictions, if the discrimination has con-
tinued into the limitation period. The theory originated in the district
court case of Quarles v. Phillp Morris, Inc.,1 and was developed and
expanded to cover various employment practices. Congress indicated
its approval of the principle and its application in the 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII.t 2 The United States Supreme Court, however, did
8. "Make whole" relief means that courts try to place a victim of employment dis-
crimination in the position, e.g., wage level, employment seniority, or job placement, in
which he or she would have been had there been no discrimination by the employer. See
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-65 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-22 (1975).
9. See Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1978).
10. This broad relief sometimes has covered a period going back to the effective date of
Title VII. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978); Miller v.
Miami Prefabricators, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 4ccord, In re Consolidated
Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), consideration of
pettionfor writ of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, 442 U.S. 916
(1979). Two examples of this broad relief are retroactive seniority for victims of a discrimi-
natory hiring practice, see note 132 & accompanying text infra, and back pay for victims of a
discriminatory promotion practice, see note 134 infra.
11. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). Quarles also originated the "present effects of
past discrimination" theory of substantive liability under Title VII. For discussion of this
theory, see notes 36, 97 injra. This theory was the second of three theories of substantive
liability. The "disparate treatment" theory came before it. See note 27 infra. The "dispa-
rate impact" theory was developed after it. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
12. The conference committee report on the amendments recognized that the federal
courts had read the time limits of Title VII in a manner that gave the aggrieved person the
maximum benefit of the law. The report implied that the lengthening of the time limits was
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not address the validity of the theory until 1977, when it decided United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans.13 Little analysis of the theory may be found in
court opinions, although the theory has attracted recent attention in the
secondary literature. 14
This Note has three main objectives: First, to clarify the continu-
ing violation theory by breaking it into three sub-theories, using the
violation and remedy phases as tools for analysis; second, to analyze
the decision in UnitedAir Lines, Inc. v. Evans,15 focusing on the juris-
dictional qualities of the continuing violation theory; and third, to de-
termine the present viability and scope of the continuing violation
theory. The discussion of Evans and the subsequent use of the continu-
ing violation theory by lower federal courts after Evans support the
conclusion that two of the three sub-theories remain viable.
The Three Sub-Theories
The continuing violation theory can be viewed as encompassing
three separate sub-theories, each applicable to distinct fact situations.
Although these three sub-theories are not recognized explicitly by the
courts as discrete legal theories, most continuing violation actions fit
into one of the categories, making the sub-theories useful tools for un-
derstanding and analyzing the cases. 16
The first is the "continuing course of conduct" sub-theory. It ap-
plies when an individual plaintiff (rather than a class) has been sub-
jected to a series of separate, but related, discriminatory acts by an
employer, one of which took place during the limitation period. The
second sub-theory pertains when an employer has maintained a "con-
tinuing pattern or practice of discrimination" against a class of individ-
uals based on their race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. 17 The
to have no effect on the continuing violation theory, thereby expressing approval of the
theory. See 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7167 (1972) (conference report submitted by Senator
Williams).
13. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
14. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 884-908
(1976); Jackson & Matheson, The Continuing Violation Theory and the Concept of Jurisdiction
in Title VII Suits, 67 GEO. L.J. 811 (1979); Note, Title VII and the Continuing Violation
Theory. A Return to Congressional Intent, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 894 (1979); Note, Continu-
ing Violations of Title VII. A Suggested Approach, 63 MINN. L. REV. 119-50 (1978); Com-
ment, Continuing Violations in Private Suits Under Title V1II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
32 ARK. L. REV. 381 (1978).
15. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
16. This approach for analyzing the continuing violation theory was suggested by two
authorities in the field, Barbara Schlei and Paul Grossman. They call the sub-theories "con-
tinuing course of conduct," maintenance of a "system" of discrimination, and "present ef-
fects of past discrimination." B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 884-908 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Tarvesian v. Carr Div. of TRW, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1976).
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third sub-theory is called the "present effects of past discrimination"
sub-theory. It applies when the plaintiff presently is suffering from the
adverse effects of discrimination that occurred prior to the limitation
period. This third theory for finding jurisdiction creates considerable
confusion due to a correlative substantive theory of liability under Title
VII by the same name. Thus the phrase "present effects of past dis-
crimination" not only defines a theory allowing courts to find jurisdic-
tion over a cause of action based on conduct first occurring prior to the
limitations period, but also is the name of a theory upon which plain-
tiffs have proven substantive violations of Title VII. This Note focuses
on the former, jurisdictional theory, although the substantive theory
also is discussed in light of the Evans decision.
Continuing Course of Conduct
The continuing course of conduct sub-theory applies only to the
discriminatory acts of an employer against an individual, rather than
against an entire class. This sub-theory applies when a plaintiff alleges
two or more related discriminatory acts, at least one of which took
place during the limitation period. The requirement that the acts be
related operates to toll the running of the limitation period as long as
the acts continue. Because at least one discriminatory act must take
place during the limitation period, the issue of timeliness of the charge
never arises. The continuing course of conduct sub-theory thus serves
the purpose of allowing a court to obtain jurisdiction over discrimina-
tory acts taking place prior to the limitation period and to grant relief
based on this broader range of conduct during the remedy phase. This
sub-theory, which does not create substantive liability, is never auto-
matically applicable, but has been applied in the following employ-
ment contexts: a layoff followed by repeated refusals to rehire;' s
repeated denials of applications for employment,1 9 repeated denials of
overtime,20 and repeated denials of promotion.2'
Continuing Pattern or Practice of Discrimination
The continuing pattern or practice of discrimination sub-theory is
applicable to class-wide discrimination by an employer where a plain-
tiff attacks either a specific employment practice or "across-the-board"
discrimination.22 As a general rule, this sub-theory requires the pres-
18. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
19. Molybdenum Corp. of America v. EEOC, 457 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1972).
20. Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973).
21. Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972); Anderson v. United States
Steel Corp., 18 F.E.P. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1978).
22. "Across-the-board" discrimination is the phrase used when an employer discrimi-
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ence of a continuing discriminatory practice against a class23 and a con-
tinuing employment relationship. Once the employment relationship is
severed permanently due to discharge or resignation, any continuing
violation terminates as to that individual employee.24 This severance
starts the running of the limitation period for any violations then ex-
isting.25 In addition, the limitation period for a charge based on a dis-
nates in hiring, job assignments, promotions, and other employment practices. The phrase
does not apply to discrimination which is limited to one employment practice. This sub-
theory applies to circumstances in which the government could bring an action under § 707
of Title VII after it had reason to believe that an employer followed a pattern or practice of
discrimination. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
23. Private suits under the continuing pattern or practice sub-theory are very amenable
to class action treatment. Unnamed class members need not meet procedural requirements
for Title VII claims such as filing charges with the EEOC. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). If the named plaintiff meets all the procedural
requirements, as well as the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, he or she may represent a class of all similarly situated individuals who could have
filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC on the date his or her charge was filed.
Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978). Since severance of the em-
ployment relationship starts the running of the limitation period, any individuals whose
employment ended more than the applicable number of days before the plaintiff filed
charges would not have viable claims and could not be included in the class. Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). See Kyriazi
v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978). But see Briggs v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 15 F.E.P. 937 (E.D. Va. 1976) (across-the-board discrimination alleged, class
included individuals who were or might have been employed by defendants since July 2,
1965). Therefore all class members would have viable Title VII charges, and they would
each satisfy the timeliness requirement of the violation phase.
24. This is not the case with layoffs. If there is a layoff with the possibility of recall, the
employment relationship continues and the limitation period is tolled. See Macklin v.
Spector Freight Sys. Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co.,
409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969). An exception to the employment relationship element of the
sub-theory arises when an employer's hiring practices are subject to Title VII attack. If a
discriminatory hiring practice continued into the limitation period, all victims of hiring dis-
rimination after the effective date of Title VII may obtain relief and need not meet the
employment relationship element nor point to any specific act of discrimination taking place
during the limitation period. The continuing presence of the discriminatory hiring practice
is sufficient to satisfy the violation phase. Thus, a minority or woman applicant who applied
for a job before the limitation period and was discriminatorily denied employment would
still have a timely charge without having reapplied during the limitation period if the em-
ployer's hiring practice constituted a continuing violation. Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge
Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1016 n.9 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Kohn v. Royall,
Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.
1974) (charge timely, although only application well outside charge-filing period). If an
employer had a continuing discriminatory hiring practice from the effective date of Title VII
(July 2, 1965) to the date EEOC charges were filed, all individuals who applied for jobs
during that time period and were discriminatorily denied employment could obtain relief in
a Title VII action. Briggs v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 15 F.E.P. 937 (E.D. Va.
1976).
25. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1149
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criminatory discharge is not tolled when the individual subsequently is
rehired and the adverse effects of the discharge continue.26
When a plaintiff invokes the continuing pattern or practice sub-
theory, he or she must directly attack the legality of a present employ-
ment practice. To establish substantive liability, three theories of prov-
ing unlawful conduct have evolved: the disparate treatment approach
of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,27 the disparate impact approach
of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,28 and the present effects of past discrimi-
nation substantive theory.29 The continuing pattern or practice sub-
theory has been applied to the following employment practices: pro-
motion,30 transfer,31 hiring,32 layoff and recall,33 and retirement pen-
(7th Cir. 1978), consideration ofpettion for writ of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228,
1234 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Accord, Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1975) (challenge to sex-segregated jobs rejected on ground that charge was not timely filed
after discharge); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975).
26. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
27. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The disparate treatment approach is an indirect method of
proving intentional discrimination which relies on "comparative" evidence between "simi-
larly situated" persons. The elements are: (1) persons of one race, sex or ethnic group re-
ceive different treatment from persons of another race, sex or ethnic group who are
otherwise similarly situated; and (2) there is no adequate nonracial or other explanation for
the different treatment. Id. at 802-03. If both elements are present, a court will infer that
race, sex, or ethnic group was a factor in the disparate treatment. Id. at 802. McDonnell
Douglas was a case involving individual disparate treatment, based on allegedly intentional
race discrimination. McDonnell Douglas set up a three step procedure for shifting the bur-
den of proof in a disparate treatment case. The Title VII complainant must carry the initial
burden of proving a prima facie case of race discrimination. Id. The complainant may do
this by showing "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." Id.
Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs rejection. Id. In the third stage,
the plaintiff tries to prove that defendant's stated reason for the action was in fact a pretext
and that the real reason was racial discrimination. Id. at 804.
28. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Under the Griggs approach, the plaintiff must first prove that
an employer's rule or classification has the impact (effect) of denying employment opportu-
nities to a "protected" class, e.g., blacks, women. The burden then shifts to the defendant-
employer to justify the adverse impact through proof of "business necessity." Id. at 431.
29. See notes 36, 97 infra.
30. E.g., Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Marquez v. Omaha
Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971).
31. E.g., Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 458 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1972); Bing v. Road-
way Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971); Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F.
Supp. 310 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
32. Efg., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bou-
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sion plans.34 As mentioned earlier, discharges can not form the basis
for a continuing violation. 35
Present Effects of Past Discrimination
The present effects of past discrimination sub-theory arises in situ-
ations in which the adverse effects of a past discriminatory act continue
into the limitation period.36 Plaintiffs urging the use of this sub-theory
cannot rely on the discriminatory act or practice by itself as the basis
dreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Kohn v.
Royall, Koegal & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d
Cir. 1974); Briggs v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 15 F.E.P. 937 (E.D. Va. 1976).
See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). But see Molybdenum Corp. of
America v. EEOC, 457 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1972) (discriminatory refusal to hire only one
individual rather than a class is not a continuing violation).
33. E.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cox v.
United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Tippett v. Liggett & Myers To-
bacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp.
891 (D. Me. 1970).
34. E.g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 939 (1971); American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1974); Mixson v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 334 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
35. E.g., Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 18 F.E.P. 642 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Consoli-
dated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), consideration
of petition for writ of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, 442 U.S.
916 (1979); Greene v. Carter Carburetor Co., 532 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1976); Olson v. Rem-
brandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Tarvesian v. Carr Div. of TRW, Inc., 407
F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1976).
36. These adverse effects could include less seniority, holding a lower level job than the
one the employee should have been promoted to, or continuing to work at an undesirable
job. See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 654-655 (2d Cir. 1976) (less seniority); Williams
v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 530 F.2d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 1975) (less seniority);
Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 1970) (lower paying jobs); Kennan v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 721, 724-728 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (less seniority);
Tippett v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292, 296 (M.D.N.C. 1970) (less
seniority). But several cases have held that similar adverse effects did not create a continu-
ing violation. See, e.g., Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1975)
(neither continued nonemployment after discharge nor denial of request for reinstatement
created a continuing violation); King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 8 F.E.P. 339, 340-341
(M.D.N.C. 1974) (plaintiff discharged and rehired as new employee, less seniority did not
create continuing violation); Jennings v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 2 F.E.P. 1042, 1043 (W.D. Tenn.
1970), affId, 3 F.E.P. 810 (6th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff passed over for promotion; no continuing
violation despite lower salary and less seniority).
Present effects of past discrimination is also a theory of substantive liability under Title
VII. The theory originated in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968), and was used almost exclusively to invalidate departmental seniority systems. The
theory had two elements: (1) an employer intentionally discriminated against a class based
on their race, sex, or like circumstances prior to the passage of Title VII; and (2) a present,
facially neutral employment practice perpetuated the adverse effects of the prior discrimina-
tion. Id. at 517-18. The typical case, and that of Quarles, involved a departmental seniority
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for a viable charge under Title VII because when this theory applies,
such a claim either is time-barred by EEOC filing requirements or is
based on pre-Act discrimination. Although the courts have failed to
explain how continuing adverse effects can satisfy the violation phase,
presumably it is because either the effects operate to toll the running of
the limitation period on the past act or themselves constitute a viola-
tion. In this manner, a plaintiff could rely solely on "present effects" to
satisfy the violation phase and try to obtain relief for the past discrimi-
nation in the remedy phase.37
A common situation in which a plaintiff relies solely on present
effects to satisfy the violation phase arises when an employee continues
to have less employment seniority throughout his or her employment
due to a past discriminatory act. For example, in Williams v. Norfolk &
Western Railway Co., 38 the employer required plaintiffs to give up their
accumulated seniority and start as new employees following a merger.
The court held that the plaintiffs' charges were timely, even though
they were filed many years after the merger, and granted them recovery
based on their original seniority dates.39
The main weakness with the present effects of past discrimination
sub-theory is that courts fear that it could effectively eliminate any lim-
itation period for Title VII actions.40 This fear has some merit, but
does not necessitate rejection of the sub-theory. Some courts have re-
system that "locked" minority workers into inferior departments into which they were dis-
criminatorily assigned when first hired. Id. at 519.
37. An example would be where a female teacher is not given an incremental raise
after a school year of which she missed a large part due to the school board's mandatory
maternity leave policy. The loss of the increment would keep the teacher one step lower on
the salary scale thereafter. The present effects of past discrimination sub-theory arguably
would be applicable to her situation. She could use the continuing lower earnings to satisfy
the violation phase and reach back to the date of the denial of the increment in the remedy
phase. See Farris v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978) (court interpreted Evans
as barring plaintiffs claim of continuing discriminatory effect). Several cases have held that
present effects of a past discriminatory act rendered timely an ostensibly late filing of a
charge with the EEOC. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 987 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 1969); Jamison v.
Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 458-59 (S.D. W. Va. 1971).
38. 530 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 541-43. But see Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973) (similar facts, held no continuing violation). A leading case
supporting the present effects of past discrimination sub-theory is Marquez v. Omaha Dist.
Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971), which held: "While it is true. . . that the Act
[Civil Rights Act of 1964] was intended to have prospective application only, relief may
nevertheless be granted to remedy present and continuing effects of past discrimination."
Id. at 1160.
40. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560 (1977) (substitution of
claim for senority for any other claim barred by limitations); In re Pretrial Proceedings in
the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1148 (7th Cir. 1978), consideration ofpetition/or writ of
cert. de/erredsub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, 442 U.S. 916 (1979) ("an appli-
March 19801
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
lied on their own judgment to determine whether the prior discrimina-
tory act was sufficiently marked at a particular date to make' it
unreasonable for an individual plaintiff to wait and then rely on the
"present effects" to satisfy the violation phase.41
The present effects of past discrimination sub-theory must be dis-
tinguished from the disparate impact theory of substantive liability in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.42 In Griggs, the employer required a high
school diploma and passing of a standardized general intelligence test
as a condition of employment in or transfer to most jobs. The Supreme
Court held these requirements to be illegal due to their disparate im-
pact upon minorities. The Court set down the rule that even absent
intent to discriminate, an employment practice neutral in form, but
which operates to exclude a disproportionate number of minority
group members, violates Title VII unless the employer can prove that
the policy is related to job performance. 43 Griggs has been broadly ap-
plied in many contexts of employment discrimination law to invalidate
practices which have a disparate impact on minorities.44
Evans and Teamsters: The Leading Cases
The United States Supreme Court first considered the continuing
violation theory in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans.45 In Evans, the
Court considered whether present, continuing adverse effects of a past
discriminatory act would satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the
violation phase under the present effects of past discrimination sub-
theory of the continuing violation theory and whether such effects
cation of the theory in its broadest terms would vitiate the filing requirement"); Cisson v.
Lockheed-Georgia Co., 392 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
41. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 908 (1976). See,
e.g., Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859
(1973); King v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 8 F.E.P. 339 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Jennings v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 2 F.E.P. 1042 (W.D. Tenn. 1970), af'd, 3 F.E.P. 810 (6th Cir. 1971).
42. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs could be interpreted as being limited to situations
where the disparate impact perpetuates the effect of a prior discriminatory act. There was a
prior discriminatory act in Griggs, and the Court did say a neutral practice cannot "operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430. How-
ever, this appears in the portion of the opinion describing the history of the case, and the
Court does not so limit itself in its discussion and holding. The Griggs rationale has been
applied in several cases to invalidate present practices even absent past intentional discrimi-
nation. See note 44 infra.
43. 401 U.S. at 425-26, 430-34.
44. Some of the practices invalidated under the Griggs theory are "physical agility"
tests for police officers which excluded females, Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975); arrest records, Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp.
401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modoled, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); and subjective criteria used in
making promotions, Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
45. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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could cause an otherwise neutral seniority system to be in violation of
Title VII under the present effects of past discrimination theory of sub-
stantive liability.46 The Court addressed the continuing violation the-
ory, but without any clear determination of its legal validity.47 A
companion case, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,48 addressed related issues and helped clarify the import of Ev-
ans. In Teamsters, the Court considered whether a departmental sen-
iority system that perpetuates the effects of discrimination which
occurred prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is immu-
nized from attack by section 703(h) of Title VII. 49
Evans is the only case in which the Supreme Court has addressed
the continuing violation theory. The general, ambiguous statements in
Evans concerning the theory have caused confusion among Title VII
litigants. This Note analyzes Evans and examines how lower courts
have interpreted the effect of the decision on the viability of the contin-
uing violation theory as a means of finding jurisdiction. Evans and
Teamsters also are key cases on the present effects of past discrimina-
tion theory of substantive liability; however this feature of the cases,
considered previously by others,50 will be addressed only briefly in this
Note.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans
The plaintiff in Evans was a female flight attendant who was
forced to resign from her position with United Air Lines in 1968 pursu-
ant to a company rule forbidding stewardesses from marrying. This
policy subsequently was found unlawful in a case in which Evans was
not a party,51 resulting in the discontinuance of the no-marriage policy
in 1968. In 1972, the airline rehired Evans, treating her as a new em-
ployee, and refused to credit her with seniority for her prior service.
Under United's seniority system only continuous service could be con-
sidered in determining seniority. Evans filed a claim with the EEOC in
46. See note 36 supra.
47. 431 U.S. at 558-60.
48. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
49. Id. at 348-56. Teamsters generally is limited to issues of substantive liability, but
the Court did mention the continuing violation theory. Id. at 345. See notes 85-99 & ac-
companying text infra.
50. In depth treatment of this issue can be found in the secondary literature. See, e.g.,
Note, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439 (1978); Note, The Seniority System Exemption in Title VII.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 585 (1978);
Note, 52 TuL. L. Rav. 397 (1978); Note, 31 VAND. L. REv. 151 (1978); Comment, Teamsters,
Evans and Title V" Will Women Be the Ultimate Losers, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 761 (1978).
See note 36 supra.
51. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971).
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1973 and later filed suit in federal court.52 She based her claim both on
United's employment seniority system, which perpetuated the effects of
the prior discharge, and the subsequent refusal to credit her for her
prior service when she was rehired.5 3 She alleged that a continuing
violation existed because of the present, continuing effects of less
wages, fringe benefits, and seniority, and that this made her charge
timely.5 4
The district court dismissed her suit for failure to file a timely
charge." The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, but reheard the case
after the Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co.,56 and reversed.5 7 In Franks, the defendant employer was charged
with maintaining a continuing discriminatory hiring practice, unrelated
to a seniority system, in violation of Title VII. The Supreme Court
held that where the plaintiffs had proven that a present hiring practice
violated Title VII, section 703(h), which exempts bona fide seniority
systems from the scope of the Act, 58 would not bar the award of retro-
active seniority to black applicants who were discriminatorily denied
employment as over-the-road truck drivers. 59
The Holding in Evans
After the Seventh Circuit rehearing and reversal, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.60 The Court summarily rejected any argu-
52. 431 U.S. at 554-56.
53. The Evans case involved an employment seniority system, as opposed to the de-
partmental seniority system at issue in Teamsters. Evans' seniority credit affected both her
competitive seniority (promotions and layoffs) and her benefit seniority (wages and fringe
benefits).
54. 431 U.S. at 557.
55. Evans' complaint was dismissed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over a time-barred claim. The district court also held that
Evans had not been suffering from any continuing violation. See 431 U.S. at 556 n.8.
56. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
57. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976). The Seventh Circuit
interpreted Franks to mean that retroactive seniority should be granted and that § 703(h) is
no bar when a seniority system perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. The rationale
for the court's reversal derives from the fact that continuous time-in-service method of cal-
culating seniority, as used in United's seniority system, works to the disadvantage of a class
of rehired employees. This rule causes the seniority system to perpetuate the adverse effects
of the 1968 forced resignation.
58. Section 703(h) states in part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority. . . system. . . , provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
59. 424 U.S. at 757-77.
60. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 429 U.S. 917 (1976).
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ment that Evans' 1968 forced resignation 6' or the refusal to credit her
with pre-1972 seniority upon rehiring62 satisfied either the substantive
liability or the jurisdictional filing requirements of the violation phase.
After a short discussion of the merits, the Court also rejected Evans'
attack on the legality of the seniority system.63 The Court held that the
district court properly dismissed her complaint,64 and reversed the Sev-
enth Circuit court.
Evans' attack on the legality of United's seniority system was
based on two allegations: "First, she [was] treated less favorably than
males who were hired after her termination in 1968 and prior to her re-
employment in 1972; second, the seniority system [gave] present effect
to the past illegal act and therefore [perpetuated] the consequences of
forbidden discrimination." 65
The Court answered Evans' first allegation by stating that even
though the seniority system treated men hired between 1968 and 1972
more favorably than Evans, it also treated women hired between 1968
and 1972 more favorably than Evans.66 Her argument fell because she
"failed to allege that United's seniority system differentiates between
similarly situated males and females on the basis of sex."'67
The Court answered Evans' second allegation of a substantive vio-
lation by holding that United's seniority system did not violate Title
VII even though it gave present effect to a past act of discrimination.68
Teamsters described this holding in Evans to mean that "a seniority
system is not unlawful under Title VII even though it perpetuates post-
Act discrimination that has not been the subject of a timely charge by
the discriminatee. ''69
The Court also precluded the use of the present effects of past dis-
rimination sub-theory of the continuing violation theory to findjurisdic-
61. 431 U.S. at 554-55. Evans was not a party to Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), and did not initiate any proceedings
of her own in 1968 by filing a charge with, the EEOC within 90 days (the applicable limita-
tion period) of her separation. 431 U.S. at 554-55. This ruling reaffirms lower court hold-
ings that discharges cannot be considered continuing violations. See note 35 supra.
62. The Court held that this policy was not illegal because Evans had no greater right
to employment in 1972 than any otherjob applicant and United had no obligation to credit
her with back seniority. 431 U.S. at 559 n.13. Even if the policy were illegal, her claim
would be time-barred because the alleged discriminatory act took place when she was re-
hired on February 16, 1972, and she did not file her charge until February 21, 1973. Id. at
557 n.9.
63. Id. at 558.
64. Id. at 557.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Id. at 557-58.
69. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 348 n.30.
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tion, by holding that present effects alone cannot satisfy the violation
phase.70 Instead, a plaintiff must prove that a "present violation" ex-
ists. The critical passage in the opinion stated:
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge
is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before
the statute was passed ...
Respondent emphasizes the fact that she has alleged a continu-
ing violation. United's seniority system does indeed have a continu-
ing impact on her pay and fringe benefits. But the emphasis should
not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any
present violation exists.71
The Court went on to make a final major point, that section 703(h)
of the Act "provides an additional ground for rejecting her [Evans']
claim."'7 2 Section 703(h) exempts bona fide seniority systems from the
Act where there is a lack of intent to discriminate. Since Evans did not
attack the bona fides of United's seniority system, the claim was barred.
Analysis of Evans
The first three points made by the Court seem to apply to employ-
ment practices generally and may be summarized as follows: (1) an
employment practice does not violate Title VII unless it differentiates
(by either treatment or effect) between individuals based on their sex,
race, national origin or other enumerated factors; (2) an employment
practice does not violate Title VII when it gives present effect to a past
act of discrimination against an individual;73 (3) a plaintiff may not rely
solely upon continuing effects of a past discriminatory act to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of the violation phase that plaintiffs file a
timely charge with the EEOC.
The final point made by the Court-that section 703(h) of the Act
precluded a finding that United's seniority system was unlawful-is ap-
plicable solely to seniority systems. Section 703(h) immunizes only
seniority systems from an attack based on the disparate impact ap-
70. 431 U.S. at 558. The Seventh Circuit read this as being one of the holdings in
Evans. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1149
(7th Cir. 1978), consideration of pedtion for writ of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, 442 U.S. 916 (1979).
71. 431 U.S. at 558.
72. Id. at 560.
73. This is the only means by which Evans and Griggs may be interpreted as being
consistent. United's seniority system was neutral on its face, but discriminated in its opera-
tion by denying Evans (a female) benefits that result from greater seniority. The seniority
system in Evans' case would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale, except for the fact that
the seniority system did not also adversely affect a class of female employees. This appears
to be the main reason why the Court denied Evans' claim. The second reason the claim was
rejected was that § 703(h) protects seniority systems from a Griggs-type of attack. See id. at
560.
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proach of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.74
The Court's decision thus precludes the use of present effects to
satisfy either the jurisdictional requirement of timely filing or to create
substantive liability under Title VII. A present violation thus now re-
quires proof of a direct violation under either the disparate impact or
disparate treatment liability theories. Accordingly, only the disparate
impact theory is now available to challenge present, otherwise neutral
employment practices which perpetuate the effects of a past discrimina-
tory act.75
Evans therefore had no claim under Title VII because the seniority
system had no disparate impact upon female employees and the pres-
ent adverse effects against her individually did not create substantive
liability under Title VII or satisfy the timely filing requirement. Since
the practice involved was a bona fide seniority system, and hence was
protected by section 703(h) even if it otherwise would violate Title
VII,76 there was an additional reason for holding that United's senior-
ity system itself did not violate Title VII.
The interpretation of section 703(h) becomes critical whenever the
facts ordinarily would support a claim based on the Griggs disparate
impact theory. The disparate impact would be the present adverse ef-
fects of past discrimination against a class of employees. The facts in
Teamsters presented such a situation and the Court interpreted section
703(h) to mean that seniority systems are immunized from Title VII
attack under Griggs if the attack is based on perpetuation of the effects
of pre-Act discrimination. 7 Evans held that "[a] discriminatory act
which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent
of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed."'78
In Teamsters, the Supreme Court interpreted this passage in Evans to
mean that seniority systems that perpetuate post-Act discrimination
also are legal by reason of section 703(h). 79 Therefore, under the
Court's interpretation, section 703(h) immunizes seniority systems that
perpetuate the effects of pre-Act or post-Act discrimination from attack
by means of either the disparate impact or present effects of past dis-
crimination theories of substantive liability.
The scope of Evans is limited to the violation phase of a Title VII
action; it has no effect upon the remedy phase. The Supreme Court
74. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See note 28 supra.
75. See 431 U.S. at 558. The disparate treatment theory is not applicable to such prac-
tices. See note 27 supra.
76. See 431 U.S. at 558; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at
350. See also notes 83-99 & accompanying text infra.
77. 431 U.S. at 352-53.
78. 431 U.S. at 558.
79. 431 U.S. at 348 n.30.
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expressly distinguished Evans from Franks on this basis.80 Since Evans
could not prove a present violation, her suit never entered the remedy
phase. In Franks, a present violation existed because discriminatory
hiring and transfer practices continued into the limitation period.
8
'
During the remedy phase, the Court awarded non-employee applicants
and incumbent employees who applied for transfer retroactive seniority
back to the date they applied for over-the-road driver positions. Evans
does not change the prior rule that once a violation taking place during
the limitation period is proven, a court may consider discriminatory
acts taking place prior to the limitation period when determining ap-
propriate relief.82
Teamsters v. United States
Teamsters was an action brought by the government against a
trucking company and the Teamsters union for violation of Title VII.
The government successfully proved that the company maintained a
continuing practice of discrimination against black and Spanish-sur-
named persons in hiring, assignments, and promotions. 83 The primary
discrimination alleged was that minority workers were hired only for
city driver and service positions and denied more desirable line driver
positions.84
The Teamsters union was joined as a defendant because the gov-
ernment also alleged that the departmental seniority system negotiated
between the company and the union discouraged minority workers
from transferring into the line driver department. Under the seniority
system agreement, interdepartmental transfers were conditioned upon
surrender of accumulated seniority in the previous department. The
government argued that since the forfeiture rule locked minority work-
ers into inferior jobs, the seniority system perpetuated the effects of
prior discrimination. Thus, the relevant issue for our purposes facing
the Supreme Court was whether section 703(h) of Title VII prevented
invalidation of this otherwise neutral seniority system.8 5 Section 703(h)
of Title VII provides in part:
80. 431 U.S. at 559.
81. 424 U.S. at 761-62.
82. See note 10 supra.
83. 431 U.S. at 328-29, 343. Section 707(a) of Title VII allows the government to bring
Title VII suits whenever there is "reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice" in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)
(1976).
84. 431 U.S. at 329. The line driver positions were more desirable than city driver or
service jobs because they provided an opportunity for higher income. The line driver posi-
tions constituted a separate department in the departmental seniority system. Id. at 330.
85. See § 703(h) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976).
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply differ-
ent standards of compensation or terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority. . . system,. . . pro-
vided that such differences are not the result of an intention to dis-
criminate because of race. . or national origin .... 86
The government argued that a seniority system that perpetuated
the effects of past discrimination could not be considered bona fide
under section 703(h). The union contended that the seniority system
was immunized by section 703(h) even if it perpetuated the effects of
prior discrimination. 87
The Holding in Teamsters
The Court held that a seniority system which perpetuates pre-Act
discrimination is bona fide, if it is otherwise neutral,88 does not have its
genesis in discrimination, and is negotiated and maintained free from
any intent to discriminate.8 9 Because the government conceded that
intent to discriminate was not present in the genesis, negotiation, or
maintenance of the seniority system,90 the union's seniority system did
not violate Title VII.
This holding unequally affected the two sub-classes of minority
employees created by the Court. The Court allowed the sub-class of
minority employees hired after the passage of the Civil Rights Act to
transfer into line driver jobs with retroactive "competitive" seniority
back to the date they were hired. The post-Act hiring discrimination
satisfied the violation phase for this sub-class of employees so that they
could be granted retroactive seniority in the remedy phase without re-
quiring a finding that the seniority system itself was illegal.9' The
Court denied any relief to the sub-class of minority employees hired
prior to the passage of the Act.92 The only possible Title VII violation
this sub-class could claim was the seniority system's lock-in effect.
These employees, therefore, had to challenge the legality of the senior-
86. Id.
87. 431 U.S. at 345.
88. Id. at 353-54.
89. Id. at 356.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 347-48.
92. Id. at 356. The relief they had sought was full carryover of accumulated "competi-
tive" seniority when they transferred into the line driver department. Id. at 330. The court
of appeals had granted all black and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees the right to
retain their full company seniority when they transferred into line driver jobs. Id. at 333.
"Competitive" seniority was important because it determined which employees in the line-
driver department were entitled to the best routes, the most protection against layoffs, and
other benefits. Id. at 343-44.
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ity system to satisfy the violation phase. Since the seniority system was
held to be legal, they were not entitled to relief.
The Court recognized that the departmental system did operate to
lock incumbent, minority employees into inferior jobs and would be
illegal based on a Griggs analysis unless immunized by section
703(h). 93 The Court interpreted section 703(h), however, as exempting
seniority systems from application of the Griggs rationale for finding a
violation. 94
Analysis of Teamsters
The key holding in Teamsters was that, as a result of the immunity
provided by section 703(h), "an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority
system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it
may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. ' ' 95 The Court viewed Evans as
an expansion of this holding to cover seniority systems that perpetuate
post-Act discrimination. 96
Teamsters seems to tacitly reject present effects of past discrimina-
tion as a theory of substantive liability by dealing only with a Griggs
analysis on the facts presented. The present effects theory previously
was relied on by the lower courts in cases with facts similar to Team-
sters as the basis for holding that a departmental seniority system vio-
lated Title VII.97 In Teamsters, the Court held that Griggs, which
would enable the Court to find a violation absent intent to discrimi-
nate, is inapplicable because section 703(h) requires a finding of intent
to discriminate before a seniority system that perpetuates the effects of
pre-Act discrimination may be held to be in violation of Title VII.98
This holding implies that the present effects of past discrimination the-
ory of substantive liability also is incapable of creating liability under
Title VII in the seniority system context. Moreover, this exemption
greatly weakens the Griggs rationale because seniority systems are a
widespread employment practice and the Griggs rationale was the only
93. Id. at 349.
94. Id. at 350.
95. Id. at 353-54.
96. Id. at 348 n.30. The Court stated in the Teamsters opinion: "Evans holds that the
operation of a seniority system is not unlawful under Title VII even though it perpetuates
post-Act discrimination that has not been the subject of a timely charge by the dis-
criminatees." Id.
97. Under this theory, departmental seniority systems that locked minority employees
into inferior jobs were held to be in violation of Title VII. By locking them into inferior
jobs, the seniority system perpetuated the effects of prior discriminatory job assignments,
which took place on the date of hire. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers and
Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970). For further analysis of the theory, see note 36 supra.
98. 431 U.S. at 346 n.28.
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reasonably successful means of challenging such systems. Seniority
systems now are illegal only if intent to discriminate can be found in
the creation or maintenance of the seniority system. Nonetheless, ret-
roactive seniority still may be granted in the remedy phase if the plain-
tiff can satisfy the violation phase by proving that another employment
practice, such as hiring, illegally discriminates. 99
Impact of Evans and Teamsters Upon the Continuing Violation
Theory and Each Sub-Theory
Many factors combine to preclude any certain determination of
how Evans and Teamsters affect the present vitality and scope of the
continuing violation theory. Teamsters generally was limited in scope
to the present effects of past discrimination theory of substantive liabil-
ity.100 Evans involved present effects of past discrimination both as a
theory of substantive liability and as a sub-theory of the continuing
violation theory. Moreover, Evans and Teamsters are unique in that
they both concern seniority systems, which receive special protection
under section 703(h); other employment practices lack any comparable
protection from Title VII attack. The impact of the decisions on other
employment practices may not be as dramatic.
The continuing course of conduct sub-theory apparently is unaf-
fected by Evans and Teamsters.'0 ' Evans requires strict compliance
with the rule that a plaintiff must prove a Title VII violation and timely
filing of a charge during the violation phase. These requirements nec-
essarily are satisfied under this sub-theory because it operates only if
one of a series of discriminatory acts has occurred during the limitation
period. Neither Evans nor Teamsters prevents a court from looking
back to discriminatory acts taking place prior to the limitation period
when fashioning appropriate relief during the remedy phase.10 2
The continuing pattern or practice of discrimination sub-theory
also survived Teamsters and Evans intact. 0 3 This theory is applicable
to class actions and to individual actions which allege a class-wide in-
jury. This sub-theory satisfies the Evans "present violation" require-
ment because it is used to attack a discriminatory employment practice
existing at the time EEOC charges are filed.
99. Id. at 347.
100. For an example of how lower courts have handled a challenge to a departmental
seniority system based on present effects of past discrimination after Teamsters, see Younger
v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 20 F.E.P. 776 (W.D. Va. 1979).
101. See cases cited note 148 infia.
102. Evans highlights the point that a continuing violation always ends upon a dis-
charge. Subsequent acts may create a second continuing violation, but do not toll the run-
ning of the limitation period. See note 35 supra.
103. See cases cited note 149 infra.
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Evans' strict construction of the present violation requirement may
induce some courts to place an additional burden on class members
under the continuing pattern or practice sub-theory to point to a spe-
cific discriminatory act taking place during the limitation period. °4
Prior to Evans, lower federal courts held that the presence of the dis-
criminatory practice alone was sufficient to satisfy the violation
phase. 105 Lower federal courts, however, have not felt compelled by
Evans to increase this requirement significantly. In one post-Evans
case, the court held that the continuing impact of an employer's dis-
criminatory promotion practice upon an employee causes the charge to
be considered timely.10 6 Another court held that an employee's contin-
uing interest in promotion satisfies the requirement that charges be
timely filed. 10 7
A few conclusions may be drawn as to how Evans and Teamsters
have affected the present effects of past discrimination sub-theory. Ev-
ans clearly rejects the use of the sub-theory as a means of satisfying the
timely filing requirement of the violation phase. A plaintiff must prove
that an act or practice occurring within the limitation period violated
Title VII under either the disparate impact or disparate treatment theo-
ries of substantive liability. Lower courts have followed Evans in dis-
missing the claims of plaintiffs who have relied on this sub-theory when
no present violation existed. 108
The present effects of past discrimination theory of substantive lia-
bility is weakened and limited by Evans and Teamsters to the point
104. For cases which have placed this burden on the individual plaintiffs, see EEOC v.
North Hills Passavant Hosp., 455 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Pa. 1978), modfi ed, 466 F. Supp. 783
(W.D. Pa. 1979); Gill v. Monroe County Dep't of Social Serv., 79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y.
1978). But see Stallings v. Container Corp. of America, 75 F.R.D. 511 (D. Del. 1977) (three
individual plaintiffs had timely charges of promotion discrimination even though no promo-
tional openings during limitation period).
105. See, e.g., Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1069 (1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
106. Stallings v. Container Corp. of America, 75 F.R.D. 511, 515 (D. Del. 1977).
107. Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974, 977 (9th Cir.
1978).
108. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 232-34
(Supp. 1979). See, e.g., Masco v. United Air Lines, 574 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1978) (failure to
reinstate after allegedly unlawful but time-barred separation; no present violation); Martin
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977) (present seniority consequences of a
prior allegedly discriminatory seniority adjustment in favor of two whites does not constitute
present violation); Scrammel v. City of Dallas, 565 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1978) (present effects
of sex discriminatory government retirement plan on pre-1972 retiree); Cates v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977) (present seniority consequences of past alleged
discrimination in hiring do not constitute present violation); DeGraffenreid v. General Mo-
tors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977) (same).
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that it no longer serves any purpose.' 0 9 Teamsters avoided the present
effects of past discrimination theory of substantive liability as unneces-
sary, focusing solely on the Griggs analysis. Apparently, the Griggs
analysis should now be applied to factual situations in which courts
previously had applied the present effects of past discrimination theory
of substantive liability. Once a Griggs violation is proven, a plaintill's
case could fall under the continuing pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion sub-theory if the practice involved is continuing. The Court in
Teamsters supported the view that an employment practice, other than
a seniority system,"10 which perpetuates the effects of past discrimina-
tion violates Title VII if the Griggs analysis applies, by stating: "Were
it not for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case would seem to fall
under the Griggs rationale."111
Interpretations of Teamsters and Evans
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission narrowly inter-
preted Teamsters and Evans in a memorandum issued on July 12,
1977.112 Teamsters' basic holding had been that an otherwise neutral
seniority system is "bona fide" and hence protected by section 703(h)
from Title VII attack even if it perpetuates pre-Act discrimination. The
EEOC interpreted this immunity as being limited to seniority systems
instituted prior to the effective date of Title VII (July 2, 1965) in which
there was no discriminatory intent in the genesis, maintenance, or rene-
gotiation of the system. The Commission would infer discriminatory
intent when either (1) the unions or departments were segregated prior
to the creation of the departmental seniority system or (2) the employer
is made aware that an existing departmental seniority system is locking
minority or female employees into inferior jobs, and the system is still
maintained or renegotiated when an alternative system is available."13
Grievances, EEOC charges, and charges filed with other compliance
agencies are among the factors which should show awareness by the
defendant of the seniority system's lock-in effect.114
The EEOC interpreted Evans as holding only that discharges are
not continuing violations," 5 so that a charge must be filed within 180
days of discharge or be time-barred. According to the EEOC, the Ev-
ans case does not affect the continuing violation principle with respect
109. See cases cited note 150 infra, But see Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586
F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978) (in present effects of past discrimination case, court may require
modifications of present promotion procedure despite Evans).
110. 431 U.S. at 349.
111. Id.
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to other employment practices. In particular, transfer and promotion
practices may be deemed continuing violations. 116
The EEOC interpretation of Teamsters and Evans may be overly
narrow in several respects. First, there is no language in Teamsters or
section 703(h) to support the EEOC's assertion that the section protects
only those seniority systems instituted prior to the effective date of Title
VII. Second, the courts may not be as generous to plaintiffs as the
EEOC in setting standards for a finding of discriminatory intent."l 7
Courts may not consider notice to an employer of a seniority system's
lock-in effect sufficient to show discriminatory intent. Third, the Evans
opinion does more than just hold that discharges cannot be continuing
violations. The EEOC ignored two passages in Evans that seem to be
much broader in their implications. One conveys the view that present
effects alone are insufficient to constitute a present violation,"t 8 while
the other says that discriminatory acts may be considered "lawful"
when no charge is filed within the applicable time period after the
act. 119
Defendants in Title VII actions have argued that Evans should be
broadly interpreted as a rejection of the entire continuing violation the-
ory. 120 Two passages from the opinion might lend support to this inter-
pretation. The first passage, previously quoted, states that no present
116. Id.
117. Intent to discriminate usually is not a required element in proving a violation of
Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Teamsters held that a senior-
ity system does not violate Title VII unless it had its genesis in racial discrimination or was
negotiated or maintained for an illegal purpose. 431 U.S. at 356. This ruling may create a
standard for seniority systems similar to that for constitutional violations by discrimination
in employment, see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 425 U.S. 229 (1976); and education, see, e.g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
118. The Court stated: "Respondent emphasizes the fact that she has alleged a continu-
ing violation. United's seniority system does indeed have a continuing impact upon her pay
and fringe benefits. But the emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical
question is whether any present violation exists." 431 U.S. at 558 (emphasis by the Court).
119. The Court stated: "But United was entitled to treat that past act as lawful after
respondent failed to file a charge of discrimination within the 90 days then allowed by
§ 706(d)." Id. at 558. But lower federal court cases decided after Evans have relied on the
EEOC Interpretative Memorandum, and one court appears to have accepted it as a whole.
See Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
120. The cases do not provide a full description of this argument, but see Kyriazi v.
Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 901 (D.N.J. 1978) (defendants argued that Evans abro-
gates the continuing violation theory); White v. City of Suffolk, 460 F. Supp. 516, 519 (E.D.
Va. 1978) (defendant argued that no relief can be based on acts occurring before the limita-
tion period); Anderson v. United States Steel Corp., 18 F.E.P. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (same);
Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F. Supp. 310, 311 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (defendants
argued that Evans abrogates the continuing violation theory). This possible interpretation of
Evans was recognized and discussed in B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW (Supp. 1979); Comment, Continuing Violations in Private Suits Under Title VII
of the Civil Rfights Act of 1964, 32 ARK. L. REV. 381, 389-90 (1978).
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violation existed even though United's seniority system had a continu-
ing adverse impact upon Evans.' 2 ' This passage is ambiguous but ap-
parently involves two conclusions of law. First, present effects alone do
not satisfy the present violation requirement. A present employment
practice must violate Title VII for a plaintiff to meet this requirement.
Second, a seniority system does not violate Title VII even though it
continually deprives a plaintiff of pay and fringe benefits. Defendants
may argue that these conclusions of law reject the continuing violation
theory because they preclude a plaintiff from satisfying the violation
phase by alleging either present effects alone or a present employment
practice that perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. 22 The pas-
sage from Evans, however, has no effect upon the first two sub-theories
of the continuing violation theory because the violation phase is satis-
fied in each by the occurrence of a discriminatory act or practice during
the limitation period.
The second passage which supports the contention that Evans re-
jects the continuing violation theory is more troubling. The Court
stated: "But United was entitled to treat that past act as lawful after
respondent failed to file a charge of discrimination within the 90 days
then allowed by § 706(d)."' 23 A defendant could argue that this pas-
sage should be interpreted to mean that once the limitation period for
any discriminatory act runs, it becomes "lawful" and may not be con-
sidered in either the violation or the remedy phases of a Title VII ac-
tion.
This passage need not indicate the end of the continuing violation
theory. According to the Court, the only discrimination present in Ev-
ans' case was her dismissal in 1968. This was a single, distinct discrimi-
natory act which started the running of the limitation period. Even
though the adverse effects resulting from the dismissal continued to in-
jure Evans, they were held insufficient to toll the running of the limita-
tion period for her claim.' 24 Accordingly, the discriminatory act of
dismissal had "no present legal consequences."'' 25 The Court was ad-
dressing the present effects of past discrimination sub-theory only when
121. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
122. These are the two purposes for using the present effects of past discrimination sub-
theory. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
123. 431 U.S. at 558. The Court continued: "A discriminatory act which is not made
the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred
before the statute was passed .... [It is merely an unfortunate event in history which has
no present legal consequences." Id.
124. Continuing adverse effects may result from any unfavorable employment decision.
For example, an employee who is discharged loses his or her source of income, which may
lead to consumer and family problems. He or she may have trouble finding another job
because of the bad mark on his or her record. The effects could continue ad infinitum.
125. 431 U.S. at 558.
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it held that a discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely
charge is equivalent to a discriminatory act which occurred before the
statute was passed. 26 They are equivalent only in that neither would
be actionable under Title VII. These statements by the Court only ap-
ply to a past discriminatory act and not to continuing violations, e.g.,
discriminatory promotion practices. Past discrimination still may be
remedied if it is part of a practice which continued into the limitation
period.
Plaintiffs may argue that Evans does not abrogate the continuing
violation theory because the decision is limited in scope to the violation
phase 27 and that the statements made by the Court are inapplicable to
the remedy phase. The second passage above accordingly could mean
that although once the limitation period runs on a single past discrimi-
natory act or practice the practice may be characterized as "lawful," it
does not become lawful when a continuing violation exists. The past
discrimination continues to be in violation of Title VII because either a
pattern of related, discriminatory acts has continued into the limitation
period 28 or a discriminatory employment practice has continued into
the limitation period, 129 facts not present in Evans.
Evans does not preclude courts from considering discrimination
occurring prior to the limitation period for purposes of fashioning ap-
propriate relief during the remedy phase. One of the 1972 amendments
to Title VII contradicts any such notion because it places a ceiling of
two years on back pay liability as a remedy for a Title VII violation. 30
This amendment tacitly supports the continuing violation theory. It
implies that the back pay remedy may exceed the limitation period, for
otherwise the amendment would be pointless. Several lower federal
courts have granted back pay up to the two year ceiling. 13 1 In
Franks 32 and Teamsters,133 the Supreme Court granted post-Act
126. Id.
127. See Miller v. Miami Prefabricators, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
128. This would constitute a continuing violation under the "continuing course of con-
duct" sub-theory. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
129. This would constitute a continuing violation under the "continuing pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination" sub-theory. See text accompanying notes 22-35 supra.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Congressional support for the continuing violation
theory also may be gleaned from the congressional debate on the 1972 amendments, in
which it was stated that "certain types of violations are continuing in nature," and in such
circumstances it is appropriate to "measur[e] the running of the required time period from
the last occurrence of the discrimination and not from the first occurrence." 118 CONG.
REC. 7167 (1972) (conference report).
131. See, e.g., Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974 (9th
Cir. 1978); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 919 (1977).
132. 424 U.S. at 780.
133. 431 U.S. at 347.
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discriminatees retroactive seniority back to the date they applied for
employment. The granting of such broad relief by the courts indicates
that a court may consider discrimination taking place between the ef-
fective date of Title VII and the limitation period during the remedy
phase if a continuing violation is present. 134
Reaction in the Courts
The courts appear to be moving toward a position between the two
extreme interpretations of Evans and Teamsters discussed. Nearly
every federal court considering the continuing violation theory after
Evans and Teamsters has held that these cases do not invalidate the
continuing violation theory. 135
The Teamsters decision has received very little discussion in later
134. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978). This broad
remedy would refute any contention that Evans rejected the continuing violation theory or
limited available relief to the time frame of the limitation period.
Denial of promotion or hire after the effective date of Title VII also may affect the
calculation of a plaintiff's back pay award. Back pay is determined by the differential be-
tween the amount actually paid to the employee and the pay he or she would have received
had there been no discrimination.
Although the point is debatable, the continuing violation theory could increase a plain-
tiff's back pay award by enabling a court to look at all discriminatory denials of promotion
occurring after the effective date of Title VII rather than just during the two year "cap"
period. For example, if an individual were denied a promotion at a very early date, it is
possible that he or she would have been promoted up several steps by the time the two year
"cap" period began. A gap of several steps in the promotion ladder would lead to the calcu-
lation of a much larger back pay differential for the two year period. See Verzosa v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Miami Prefabri-
cators, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 4cco. d, In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceed-
ings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), consideration ofpetition for writ of
cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World Airlines v. Zipes, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); Kyriazi v. West-
ern Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
135. E.g., Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978),
consideration ofpetition for writ of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Zipes, 442 S. 916 (1979); Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Patterson v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978); Guardians Ass'n of the New York City
Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ridgeway v.
IBEW Local 134, 466 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. IM. 1979); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F.
Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1978); Lelong v. Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz, 19 F.E.P. 365 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Anderson v. United States Steel Corp., 18 F.E.P. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1978); White v. City
of Suffolk, 460 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Va. 1978); Caldweil v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F.
Supp. 310 (D.N.C. 1977). The Seventh Circuit has stated: "Neither the EEOC nor the
courts have construed Evans as eliminating entirely the continuing violation theory." In re
Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1149 n.12 (7th Cir.
1978), consideration ofpetition for writ of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World Airlines v.
Zipes, 442 U.S. 916 (1979). Another court has noted: "It is clear to this Court that Evans
does not overrule the 'continuing violation' theory of Title VII." Kyriazi v. Western Elec.
Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 901 (D.N.J. 1978).
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cases involving allegations of a continuing violation. 36 Most of the
cases discussing Teamsters limited the application of its holding to sen-
iority systems.' 37 The common view is that Teamsters holds only that
section 703(h) of Title VII prevents invalidation of an otherwise neutral
seniority system that perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimina-
tion. 138 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals views Teamsters as hold-
ing that section 703(h) "carves out an exception to the holding of
Griggs that an otherwise neutral practice which perpetuates the effects
of past employment discrimination is violative of Title VII."'1 39 This
court read Teamsters as being a narrow exception, limited to bona fide
seniority systems. 140
Evans has been viewed by the courts as the most significant case
on the continuing violation issue. The lower courts have interpreted
Evans' primary holding as being that present, continuing adverse ef-
fects upon an individual as a result of a past discriminatory act are
insufficient to create a present violation of Title VII.' 4 1 The second
major holding of Evans, as seen by the lower courts, is that discharges
are not continuing violations, 42 or, in other words, the limitation pe-
136. Some cases which do discuss Teamsters in relation to the continuing violation the-
ory are Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978); Farris v. Board of
Educ., 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion); Guardians Ass'n of the New York
City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bartrug v.
Bailar, 18 F.E.P. 1504 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Miller v. Miami Prefabricators, Inc., 438 F. Supp.
176 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
137. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1978).
138. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bartrug v. Bailar, 18 F.E.P. 1504 (N.D. Ohio
1978). After Teamsters, a plaintiff must prove a post-Act violation rather than just the con-
tinuing effects of pre-Act discrimination. Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police
Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
139. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1978).
140. Id. See notes 88-89 & accompanying text supra.
141. E.g., Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978),
consideration of petition for writ of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Zipes, 442 U.S. 916 (1979); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.
1978); Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977); Ridgeway v. IBEW
Local 134, 466 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Del Maestro v. Postmaster General, 19 F.E.P.
297 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Lockhart v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 454 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Va.
1978), rev'don other grounds, 580 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1979); Bartrug v. Bailar, 18 F.E.P. 1504
(N.D. Ohio 1978); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978); Wood v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 442 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 580
F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1978).
142. E.g., Bracamontes v. Amstar Corp., 576 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1978); Prophet v. Armco
Steel, Inc., 575 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 455 F. Supp.
335 (W.D. Pa. 1978), modfed, 466 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Miller v. Miami Prefabri-
cators, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F.
Supp. 310 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
[Vol. 31
iod always starts to run on the date of discharge. A related holding of
Evans, reflected in later cases, is that a discriminatory act or practice
43
must take place during the limitation period for a court to hold that a
present violation of Title VII exists. 4"
Nearly all of the continuing violation cases decided after Evans
and Teamsters may be categorized under one of the three sub-theo-
ries--continuing course of conduct,145 continuing pattern or practice of
discrimination,146 and present effects of past discrimination.147 In gen-
eral, the subsequent federal court decisions have held that both the
continuing course of conduct148 and the continuing pattern or practice
143. This refers to acts or practices which violate Title VII under either the disparate
treatment, see note 27 supra, or disparate impact, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), theories of substantive liability.
144. See, ag., Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Martin v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J.
1978); EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 455 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Pa. 1978), modified,
466 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Gill v. Monroe County Dep't of Social Serv., 79 F.R.D.
316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
145. Efg., Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978);7
Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1978); Peter-
son v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 453 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Silver v. Mohasco
Corp., 19 F.E.P. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Anderson v. United States Steel Corp., 18 F.E.P. 652
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Kennedy v. New York Tel. Co., 18 F.E.P. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
146. E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978); In re Con-
solidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), considera-
tion apelition for rit of cert. deferred sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, 442
U.S. 916 (1979); Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556
F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Guardians Ass'n of the New
York City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Ridgeway v. IBEW Local 134, 466 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Kyriazi v. Western Elec.
Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978); White v. City of Suffolk, 460 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Va.
1978); Lelong v. Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz, 19 F.E.P. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); EEOC v. North
Hills Passavant Hosp., 455 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Pa. 1978), modified, 466 F. Supp. 783 (W.D.
Pa. 1979); Miller v. Miami Prefabricators, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Caldwell
v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Grano v. Department of
Dev., 16 F.E.P. 438 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Stallings v. Container Corp. of America, 75 F.R.D.
511 (D. Del. 1977).
147. E.g., Trabucco v. Delta Airlines, 590 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1979); Farris v. Board of
Educ., 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978); Bracamontes v. Amstar Corp., 576 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.
1978); Prophet v. Armco Steel, Inc., 575 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1978); Smith v. American Presi-
dent Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1978); Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d
1064 (2d Cir. 1977); Alston v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 465 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa.
1978), at'd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1979); Lockhart v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 454 F.
Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 580 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1979); Bertheas v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Del Maestro v. Postmaster
General, 19 F.E.P. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Bartrug v. Bailar, 18 F.E.P. 1504 (N.D. Ohio 1978);
Wood v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 442 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 580 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1978); Rodgers v. Berger, 438 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1977);
Myles v. Schlesinger, 436 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
148. Anderson v. United States Steel Corp., 18 F.E.P. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See, e.g.,
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of discrimination 49 sub-theories remain viable after Evans and Team-
sters, but that Evans rejects the present effects of past discrimination
sub-theory. 50
Conclusion
The Supreme Court restricted the scope of the continuing violation
theory, but did not reject it in the Evans and Teamsters decisions.' 5'
The Court strictly construed the requirements of proving substantive
liability and timely filing of a charge during the violation phase in Ev-
ans,152 broadly interpreted section 703(h) to immunize seniority sys-
tems against attacks based on disparate impact or present effects of past
discrimination in Teamsters,15 3 and showed some hostility to the con-
tinuing violation theory in Evans.154 Its creation of an exception for
seniority systems weakens the disparate impact rationale of Griggs.'55
Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Verzosa v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1978); Peterson v. Le-
high Valley Dist. Council, 453 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
149. E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978); Guardians
Ass'n of the New York City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ridgeway v. IBEW Local 134, 466 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Kyriazi v.
Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978); White v. City of Suffolk, 460 F. Supp.
516 (E.D. Va. 1978); Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.C.
1977). See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556
F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
150. E.g., Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1978); Lock-
hart v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 454 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 580 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1979); Bertheas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 450 F. Supp.
1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Wood v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 442 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Mo.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 580 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1979); Myles v. Schlesinger, 436 F.
Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See, e.g., Trabucco v. Delta Airlines, 590 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1979);
Farris v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978); Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977).
151. See note 135 supra.
152. See notes 101-07 & accompanying text supra.
153. 431 U.S. at 350.
154. The Court seemed quick to disregard past acts of discrimination, present adverse
effects like lower pay, and the "present effects of past discrimination" sub-theory as a means
of proving a Title VII violation. 431 U.S. at 558.
155. Seniority systems play a large role in the employment field and are closely related
to other employment practices. Exempting seniority systems from the Griggs analysis frus-
trates the goal set in Griggs, which is to eliminate practices which "operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430 (1971). This weakening of Griggs resulting from the Court's interpretation of
§ 703(h) does not appear to be necessary when the long line of lower federal court decisions
which concluded the contrary on the issue is considered. The holding in Teamsters that
departmental seniority systems that perpetuate the adverse effects of past discrimination are
immunized by § 703(h) from Title VII attack is contrary to the position previously taken by
six courts of appeal in over thirty cases, in an unbroken line of EEOC cases, and by the
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Evans and Teamsters do not affect the legal validity of the contin-
uing course of conduct or the continuing pattern or practice sub-theo-
ries of the continuing violation theory. Evans appears to reject the
present effects of past discrimination sub-theory entirely. The cases
place a heavy burden upon plaintiffs seeking to challenge seniority sys-
tems. 156
Plaintiffs still may find the now restricted theory very helpful in
expanding the definition of a class to allow more individuals to gain
relief in a Title VII class action. 157 Plaintiffs in either individual or
class actions under Title VII still should be able to receive much
broader relief in many instances by invoking the continuing violation
theory. 158
overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. at 378-80 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
156. A plaintiff would need to prove intent to discriminate in the genesis, negotiation, or
maintenance of the seniority system. This proof requirement could be burdensome or im-
possible.
157. See note 23 supra.
158. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
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